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DAMAGES IN AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES-THE NEED FOR
A CLOSER LOOK
I. BACKGROUND
A. The ADEA in General
Prior to 1967, older workers throughout the country were virtually un-
protected from discrimination in their employment based on age.1 In the
1960's Congress first attempted to combat such discrimination against the
elderly; however, none of the enacted statutes had an express prohibition
on age discrimination.
2
In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).3 Congress was concerned about the tragic waste of valuable
human resources in denying or restricting employment opportunities to
older Americans. 4 It was found that older workers were disadvantaged in
their efforts to remain employed, and once discharged, in their efforts to
regain employment.5 Employers engaged in the common practice of set-
ting arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job performance, with
the grave two-fold result of high unemployment among the elderly and
deterioration of skill, morale, and acceptance in the work force.6 Thus, to
protect the older worker, the ADEA was enacted. Congress articulated a
three-part purpose in the statute: (1) to promote employment of older
persons based on ability rather than age; (2) to prohibit arbitrary age dis-
crimination in employment; and (3) to help employers and workers find
solutions to problems arising from the effect of age on employment.7
B. Elimination of Discrimination Through Education
Congress was concerned not only with prohibiting discrimination based
1. C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, FEDERAL AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 59-67
(1978). Prior to 1967, employment discrimination based on age was prohibited by statute in
many states, but not in all. Id.
2. See Older Americans Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-73, 79 Stat. 219 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§9 3001-3056f (1976)); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2996 (1976)); Manpower Development and Training Act of
1962, Pub. L. No. 93-567, 88 Stat. 1845 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §9 2571-2628 (1976)).
3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
4. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REc. 34745 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Eilberg); 113 CONG. REc. 34741
(1967) (remarks of Rep. Steiger); 113 CONG. REc. 31256 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Young); 113
CONG. REc. 31254 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
5. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1); 113 CONG. REC. 31254
(1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(2), (3).
7. Id. § 621(b).
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on age but also with educating employers and the public about the aging
process." By dispelling misconceptions9 which lead to age discrimina-
tion,10 Congress expected to eliminate the problem. The education func-
tions were seen as means of effecting changes in attitude, thus inducing
compliance and making enforcement measures unnecessary.11 To inform
labor unions, management, and the general public about the needs and
abilities of older workers, the ADEA required the Secretary of Labor to
carry on a continuing program of education and information. 2
Congress was also concerned about keeping abreast of the situation it-
self. The Act required an annual report to Congress by the Secretary of
Labor, in addition to the continuing education program so that Congress
could be apprised of changing conditions and situations. s From the be-
ginning, this continuing education program has been an important part of
administering and obtaining compliance with the Act."' There is evidence,
however, that this program has not accomplished its purpose of reducing
or eliminating age discrimination. 5 Courts have suggested that allowing a
wider scope of relief might better effectuate the purposes of the Act. 6
This comment will review the relief currently available under the ADEA
and consider whether such relief has been successful in encouraging com-
pliance with the Act.
C. Coverage of the ADEA
In general, the ADEA "broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimination in
the workplace based on age." 17 The statute's remedial nature entitles it to
8. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2213, 2214.
9. One study revealed that the general public considers older workers to be less flexible,
more accident prone, and less productive than younger workers. Rosen & Gerdee, The Na-
ture of Job Related Stereotypes, 61 J. APPL. PSYCH. 180, 181-82 (1976).
10. The Senate Special Committee on Aging stated that "[the] ADEA was enacted not
only to enforce the law, but to provide facts that would help change attitudes." STAFF OF
SENATE COMM. ON AGING, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., IMPROVING THE AGE DISCRIMINATION LAW iii
(Comm. Print 1973).
11. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2213, 2216.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 622(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 632. As of July 1, 1979, all ADEA functions vested in the Secretary of
Labor were transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by Reorg. Plan
No. 1 of 1978, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 354 (Supp. M 1979),
and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
14. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMIN., AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EM-
PLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, at 14 (1979).
15. See notes 166-67 infra, and accompanying text.
16. Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 1978); Hassan v. Delta
Orthopedic Medical Group, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 1979).
17. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978).
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liberal interpretation."' The protected group within the purview of the
ADEA are persons at least forty years of age, but less than seventy years
of age.19 Employers, ° unions, 2 1 and employment agencies 22 are prohibited
from discriminating against employees23 or applicants24 in hiring, dis-
charge, promotion, training, compensation, or terms of employment be-
cause of the individual's age.25 In addition to prohibiting direct actions
which are discriminatory, the Act also prohibits practices which have the
effect of discriminating against older workers.
26
Consistent with the goal of conciliation when a violation is alleged,
27
the ADEA requires that certain administrative prerequisites be met by
the plaintiff before filing an individual action.28 Recognizing that "en-
forcement procedures are necessary to get the required attention of em-
ployers and others,"2 Congress allowed both the Equal Employment Op-
18. Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd by equally divided
court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976). An "employer" is defined as
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employ-
ees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year:... any agent of such person, and a State or political subdi-
vision of a State ... and any interstate agency, but such term does not include the
United States or a corporation wholly-owned by the government of the United States.
Id. The reference to commerce provides a basis for federal action. The commerce clause of
the United States Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o regulate commerce ... among the
several states... . " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 630(d). "Labor organization" is defined as
a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce,... in which employ-
ees participate and which exists for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of
employment, and any conference, general committee, joint or system board or joint
council so engaged which is subordinate to a national or international labor
organization.
Id.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 630(c). An "employment agency" is defined as "any person regularly un-
dertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an employer and includes
an agent of such a person, but shall not include an agency of the United States." Id.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f). "Employees" are defined as individuals "employed by any em-
ployer except that the term 'employee' shall not include any person elected to public office
in any state or political subdivision of any state ... " id., the personal staff of such officials,
appointed policy-makers, or immediate advisors who are not subject to the civil service laws
of a state government, agency, or political subdivision. Id. See also supra text accompanying
note 19.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1 1978).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
26. Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1640, 1650 (N.D. Ala.
1974), rev'd in part on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976). See also Rogers v. Exxon Research and Eng'g Co., 550
F.2d 834, 841 n.11 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1977).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See also Rogers, 550 F.2d at 841.
29. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
1983]
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portunity Commission (EEOC)30 and private parties to institute suits to
enforce the ADEA. 1 Prior to filing suit, however, a private party must file
a timely complaint with the EEOC 2 and give the EEOC time to investi-
gate the charges and attempt to effect compliance with the Act through
negotiation and conciliation.3
3
D. Relief Under the ADEA
The enforcement provisions and remedies under the ADEA are found
in subsections (b) and (c) of section 626.11 In this section, Congress specif-
ically adopted the "powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections
211(b), 216 (except subsection (a) thereof), and 217"53 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.31 Under the FLSA, an employee may be entitled
to receive an award consisting of unpaid minimum wages, unpaid over-
time compensation, and an equal amount of liquidated damages upon the
finding of a violation of its provisions.3 7 The ADEA specifies that
amounts owed to a person for a violation of the Act will be treated as
minimum wages and overtime compensation under the FLSA frame-
work.38 The FLSA provision for an award of liquidated damages is also
incorporated into the ADEA.3 9 The ADEA, however, modifies this remedy
by conditioning the award on the finding of a willful violation.4 0 The liq-
NEWS 2213, 2215.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) and (c).
31. Id. § 626(c).
32. Id. § 626(d) and (e). A complaint must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the
alleged discriminatory act. Then the complainant must wait at least 60 days after the filing
of the charges before commencing suit to allow the EEOC to attempt conciliation with the
charged party and to attempt to eliminate the alleged unlawful practice without resort to
the courts. Id. § 626(d)(1). In a deferral state (one with a state agency whose admininstra-
tive procedures and remedies must be resorted to and exhausted first, id. § 633(b)), the
complainant must file charges with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful act or
within 30 days of receipt by the complainant of notice that the state agency has terminated
its proceedings whichever is earlier. Id. § 626(d)(2). For a list of designated deferral agen-
cies, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74(a) (1982).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) flush language.
34. Id. § 626 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
35. Id. § 626(b). Subsection (a) of section 216 of the FLSA provides criminal liability for
willful violations of section 215 of the FLSA. Id. § 216(a) (1974). This criminal liability does
not apply in ADEA cases. Id. § 626(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
36. Id. § 626(b).
37. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
39. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 35 & 36.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). In defining a "willful violation," the courts in general have rejected
an analogy to criminal willfulness and have adopted the traditional civil definition. Under
this standard an employer's discriminatory act is willful when it is shown that the act was
intentional, voluntary, not accidental, mistaken, or inadvertent. See, e.g., Kelly v. American
Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1981); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276,
283 (3d Cir. 1980).
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uidated damages award is equal to the amount awarded the plaintiff for
the violation of the Act,41 in effect doubling the actual damages the plain-
tiff receives if the violation is willful.2
In addition to the incorporated FLSA remedies, the ADEA further pro-
vides that a court may grant "such legal or equitable relief" as is neces-
sary to carry out the purposes of the Act."' This language is found in both
the section applicable to actions brought by the EEOC4 and the section
applicable to actions brought by the individual employee.45
The ADEA specifically provides examples of equitable relief available
to the plaintiff,46 including "judgments compelling employment, rein-
statement or promotion .... -47 However, the words "without limitation"
precede the list of examples, evidencing an intent by Congress to afford a
court wide latitude in fashioning such equitable relief.48 At least one court
has designated an award of pension benefits as equitable relief to a pre-
vailing plaintiff where the pension rights had not yet accrued due to the
violation of the ADEA.41 Other courts have viewed lost pension rights as
an aspect of overall damages.50
In the same section of the Act, examples of legal relief available to a
plaintiff are provided.51 The court may thus enforce "liability for amounts
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation
under this section. '5 2 The same "without limitation" language seems to
41. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
42. This definition of liquidated damages differs from the usual concept, which is that
amount agreed to by the parties to a contract to be paid for a breach of contract. J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 232-36 (2d ed. 1977); D. DOBBS, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.5 (1973).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
44. Id.
45. Id. 2 626(c).
46. Id. 2 626(b).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980). The plaintiff in this case was a
55-year-old teacher. The jury awarded her $15,190 in damages. The district court judge
viewed this award as a factual conclusion that Ms. Geller was deprived of only one year's
employment by the defendant's discriminatory action and concluded that reinstatement was
inappropriate. The circuit court agreed, adding that Ms. Geller had never been formally
hired and that permanent reinstatement was therefore not warranted. The circuit court,
however, disagreed with the district court that lost pension benefits were damages assessable
by the jury. The circuit court characterized these benefits as equitable relief, available to a
plaintiff under a "make-whole" theory. Id. Cf. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1021
(1st Cir. 1979) (trial court should use its discretion in computation of award, and pension
benefits may be appropriate even though plaintiff's time with defendant employer does not
meet minimum vesting period).
50. See, e.g., Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199, 201 (D. Or. 1977).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
52. Id. In their opinions, the courts do not denominate which relief is legal and which is
1983]
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apply equally to this legal relief.5' There seems to be no question that
back pay and other lost benefits may be awarded.54 The problem arises,
however, with respect to other traditional types of legal relief.
The inclusion of the narrowly-defined FLSA remedies with the broad
phrase "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate
the purpose of this chapter"55 in the ADEA, has created an unresolved
controversy in the federal courts on the issue of the availability of com-
pensatory and punitive damages under the Act. There is no express provi-
sion in the ADEA for such damages. Compensatory damages generally are
intended to reimburse the nonpecuniary harm of physical or emotional
injury caused by the discriminatory act,56 while punitive damages usually
focus on the act of the wrongdoer.5 7 Generally, an award of punitive dam-
ages serves to deter future violations, to encourage victims to file suit, and
to punish the violator.58 A majority of the district courts" and all the
circuit courts of appeal which have addressed the issue60 have denied re-
covery of both compensatory and punitive damages. A considerable mi-
nority of district courts, however, has ruled that one or both are recover-
able. "" In addition, the two remedies have been treated inconsistently,
equitable.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971). See
also Comment, Relief Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 31 BAY-
LOR L. REv. 217, 218-19 (1979).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
56. DOBBS, supra note 42, § 12.5.
57. Id.; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 79 (1935); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed. 1971).
58. DOBBS, supra note 42, at 205.
59. See, e.g., Placos v. Cosmair, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1287 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Ginsberg v. Bur-
lington Indus., 500 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Harris v. United States Dep't of Treasury,
489 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Knerr v. Norge Co., 476 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D. Ill. 1979);
Douglas v. American Cyanamid Co., 472 F. Supp. 298 (D. Conn. 1979); Stevenson v. J.C.
Penny Co., 464 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Riddle v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 460
F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Okla. 1978); Dunwoodie v. Chrysler Corp., 459 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Mich.
1978); Schlicke v. Allen-Bradley Co., 448 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Ellis v. Philippine
Airlines, 443 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199 (D.
Or. 1977); Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1977); Looney v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co., 428 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Newkirk v. General
Elec. Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1588 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Brin v. Bigsby and
Kruthers, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 415 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
60. See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1982); Fiedler v. Indian-
head Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1982); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691
(9th Cir. 1981); Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979); Vazquez v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559
F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research &
Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
61. See, e.g., Kalli v. Great Amer. Ins. Co., 516 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Minn. 1981); Wise v.
Olan Mills Inc. of Texas, 485 F. Supp. 542 (D. Colo. 1980); Hassan v. Delta Orthopedic
Medical Group, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D. Cal. 1979); Flynn v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co.,
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with compensatory damages allowed in cases in which punitive damages
were denied.6
2
II. THE AVAILABILITY OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES UNDER THE ADEA
Prior to 1975, the ADEA was narrowly construed by the courts to pre-
clude an award of either compensatory or punitive damages.6 3 This con-
struction was supported by commentaries which viewed the ADEA as pri-
marily providing employment restitution instead of pecuniary damages.8 4
In 1975, however, in the landmark case of Rogers v. Exxon Research &
Engineering Co.,6 5 the court granted an award of compensatory damages
for pain and suffering. The district court acknowledged the lack of prece-
dent for such an award,6 6 but it concluded that the broad language of the
ADEA which permits the granting of "legal and equitable relief as may be
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, '67 includes a com-
pensatory damage award.68 The district court judge found support for his
decision through analogies to Titles VII and VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.69 He determined that since the ADEA created a new statutory
tort, the full range of legal and equitable relief was available to a prevail-
ing plaintiff.7 0 Following the Rogers decision, other federal district courts
awarded compensatory damages for pain and suffering.7' In 1977, how-
ever, the Third Circuit reversed the district court on the issue of compen-
satory damages.7 2 Its decision was based on the ADEA's silence on the
availability of such damages, on congressional intent, and on potential
impairment of the administrative conciliation process, a key element in
463 F. Supp. 676 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Morton v. Sheboygan Memorial Hosp., 458 F. Supp. 804
(E.D. Wis. 1978); Gifford v. B.D. Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Buchholz
v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating
Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd on rehearing, 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977);
Paulo v. Stiefel Laboratories, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Karijolic
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 447 (N.D. Inl. 1977).
62. See, e.g., Gifford v. B.D. Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ohio 1978). The court
concluded that Congress intended liquidated damages to take the place of punitive dam-
ages. Id. at 464.
63. See, e.g., Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
64. Agatstein, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: A Critique, 19
N.Y.L.F. 309, 319 (1973).
65. 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978).
66. 404 F. Supp. at 331.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
68. 404 F. Supp. at 333.
69. Id. at 331-33.
70. Id. at 333.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
72. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d bir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978).
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the ADEA statutory scheme. 73 The court voiced the concern that the
availability of a compensatory award would jeopardize attempts at concil-
iation and lessen the chances that employees and employers would settle
their differences out of court.7 With the reversal of Rogers7 5 courts be-
gan to reconsider compensatory damage relief under the ADEA.
A. Arguments for Recovery of Compensatory Damages
The most persuasive argument for allowing recovery of compensatory
damages for pain and suffering is the language of the ADEA itself. Sec-
tion 626 permits the court to grant "legal... relief as may be appropriate
to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limita-
tion . . . enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid mini-
mum wages or unpaid overtime compensation .... "76
In Lorillard v. Pons,7 an ADEA case in which the Supreme Court de-
cided the issue of the right to a jury trial under the Act, the Court found
it necessary to define the term "legal," as used in this section of the Act.78
The Court explained that the word "legal" is a term of art.79 When words
having a well known meaning at common law are used in a statute they
are presumed to have been used with that meaning.8 0 Therefore, the
Court inferred that Congress knew the meaning of the term "legal" when
it included that word in the statute.81 Compensatory damages are tradi-
tional legal relief.8 2 Because Lorillard decided the issue of the right to a
trial by jury, its application to the issue of damages in ADEA actions is in
dispute.83
The relief articulated in the statute is also to be "appropriate to effec-
tuate the purposes of this chapter. 84 The purposes of the ADEA are to
promote employment of older workers, to prohibit discrimination in em-
ployment based on age, and to find solutions to problems arising from the
impact of age on employment.8 " The availability of compensatory dam-
ages to counteract all possible adverse effects of age discrimination is nec-
73. 550 F.2d at 841.
74. Id.
75. 550 F.2d 834.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
77. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
78. Id. at 583.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
83. See Kennedy v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Colo. 1978).
Cf. Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979) (court did not allow
damages for pain and suffering).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
85. Id. §621(b).
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essary to accomplish this purpose.
In Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co.,8" the district court
looked at the legislative history of the Act and found that it was designed
to protect older workers from more than just the purely economic effects
of job discrimination based on age. 7 Thus, to remedy "the full scope of
the evil against which Congress sought to legislate,"8 a compensatory
damage award would be proper in the appropriate factual
circumstances.8 9
In addition, the "without limitation" language in the Act 0 is unex-
plainable if Congress did intend to limit a plaintiff's recovery to back
wages. Furthermore, subsection (b) of Section 626 is not the only subsec-
tion dealing with damages. Subsection (c)(1) allows a private right of ac-
tion "for such legal ... relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chap-
ter .... -91 In this subsection, there is no mention of the FLSA remedies
or any other limitation.9 2 "A central rule of statutory construction re-
quires that where possible, a statute should not be construed in such a
way as to render any of its parts superfluous or redundant. 9 3 To avoid
redundancy between subsections (b) and (c)(1), it must be concluded that
Congress provided relief in two separate locations, one with qualifications
and one without.9
4
Other possible arguments may be made in favor of allowing damages
for pain and suffering. Out-of-pocket losses are often negligible when
compared to the psychological and emotional injuries caused by an em-
ployer's discriminatory conduct based on age." Such an award would en-
courage employees to seek redress for violations and would deter employ-
ers from each illegal conduct. Also, compensatory damage awards could
contribute to the education of the public concerning the effects of age on
employment, as well as enhance public understanding of the statute.96 Fi-
86. 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975).
87. Id. at 330 n.3.
88. Id. at 331 n.3.
89. Id. at 330.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
91. Id. § 626(c)(1).
92. Id.
93. Hassan v. Delta Orthopedic Medical Group, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (E.D. Cal.
1979). See also Patagonia Corp. v. Board of Governors, 517 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 1975).
94. See Hassan, 476 F. Supp. 1063.
95. See Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 329 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd,
550 F.2d 834, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 (U.S. 1022 (1978). For some sources of
evidence which can be used in age discrimination cases to support adverse physical and
psychological effects of forced retirement, see the Senate Report accompanying the 1978
amendments to the ADEA. S. Rep. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 504, 506-07.
96. See Comment, Compensatory and Punitive Damages in Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment, 32 U. Fla. L. Rev. 701, 729-30 (1980).
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nally, a few courts have construed the ADEA broadly to create a new
statutory tort.17 Therefore, under traditional tort principles, a court
should allow any recovery which would make the plaintiff whole.98
B. Arguments for Denial of Compensatory Damages
The most widely cited authority for limiting the monetary relief availa-
ble to a plaintiff under the ADEA is the Third Circuit's decision reversing
the district court in Rogers."" The Third Circuit reasoned that the right
of a court to grant "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropri-
ate" 10 0 must be analyzed in light of the administrative nature of the Act
as a whole.10 1 Private actions under the ADEA are secondary to the ad-
ministrative remedies, 10 2 and the congressional committees which fash-
ioned the bill "emphasized that the most favored method of enforcement
was conciliation and mediation."'0 3 The court noted that the possibility of
compensatory damages would hamper informal attempts at settlement
and would complicate administrative procedures.104
Another rationale for limiting the plaintiff's recovery is found in Slatin
v. Stanford Research Institute.0 5 In Slatin, the Fourth Circuit focused
on the incorporation of the FLSA powers, remedies, and procedures into
the ADEA.0 6 Judicial interpretations of the remedies available under the
FLSA had not permitted the recovery of compensatory damages. 0 7 Since
it is presumed that Congress was aware of these interpretations when
drafting the Act, Congress must have meant for the ADEA to be similarly
limited."0 8 Other arguments may be made to limit damages under the
ADEA. The volume of litigation would increase substantially if employees
were urged on by the prospects of a large damage award. Also, the Con-
ference Committee Report accompanying the 1978 Amendments to the
ADEA suggested that compensatory damages for pain and suffering were
not covered by the Act.'0 9
97. See, e.g., Rogers, 404 F. Supp. at 327.
98. Id. at 328.
99. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
101. 550 F.2d at 841.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979).
106. Id. at 1293-94.
107. See, e.g., Martinez v. Behring's Bearings Serv., Inc., 501 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1974);
Powell v. Washington Post Co., 267 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Bonner v. Elizabeth Arden,
Inc., 177 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1949).
108. 590 F.2d at 129.
109. H.R. CON. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 528, 535. "The ADEA as amended by this act does not provide remedies
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These arguments, however, hardly support a refusal to award pain and
suffering damages. Knowing that a court would not award more than
back wages, it is likely that employers would refuse to settle disputes at
the administrative level. Also, the FLSA limitations do not apply to the
subsection allowing an action by an individual.110 The flood of litigation
and the frustration of the conciliation process arguments appear to be
more the product of judicial disillusionment with pain and suffering dam-
ages than an interpretation of the ADEA."' Furthermore, the opinion of
the 1978 Conference Committee is not persuasive. The intent of the Con-
gress that enacted a particular piece of legislation should influence the
courts, not the opinion of a subsequent Congress.'1 2
III. THE AvAILABILITY OF PUNITIvE DAMAGES UNDER THE ADEA
In 1976, Murphy v. American Motors Corp."s expanded the district
court's decision awarding compensatory damages in Rogers" 4 to allow re-
covery of punitive damages under the ADEA." 5 The court noted that the
ADEA authorizes both equitable and legal relief and that punitive dam-
ages are traditionally legal relief."' Thus, the court concluded that under
the Rogers statutory tort analysis, punitive damages are available under
the Act.11' Following these two decisions, several other district courts
awarded punitive damages under the ADEA."' Punitive damages were
again awarded in the northern district of Georgia in Dean v. American
Security Insurance Co." 9
In 1977, however, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's deci-
sion in Rogers."2 0 Accordingly, the courts began to reconsider the availa-
bility of punitive damages under the ADEA. The Fifth Circuit followed
the Third Circuit by reversing Dean v. American Security Insurance
of a punitive nature." Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c).
111. See Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 664 (W.D. Va. 1977).
112. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979); J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1972). -
113. 410 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd 570 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1978).
114. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975).
115. 410 F. Supp. at 1405.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd 559
F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Wilson v. American Motors
Corp., 15 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1158 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Williams v. General Motors
Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 411 (N.D. Ga. 1976), vacated, 15 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 413 (1977); Davis v. Adams-Cates Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 397
(N.D. Ga. 1976).
119. 429 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1066 (1978).
120. 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977).
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Co."' and holding that neither punitive damages nor compensatory dam-
ages are available under the ADEA.'2 2 The court concluded that congres-
sional silence on the availability of punitive damages and the statutory
liquidated damages award available under the Act indicated the congres-
sional preference for liquidated damages in lieu of punitive damages.1 23
Shortly after reversing Dean, the Fifth Circuit reversed Murphy' 4 on the
same grounds.1 25 As a result of these cases, there is little judicial support
for the availability of a punitive damages award under the ADEA. 28 A
majority of district courts127 and the circuit courts of appeal which have
considered punitive damages' 2 have denied such an award. However,
some courts do offer such relief.
129
A. Arguments Favoring Recovery of Punitive Damages
As in the case of compensatory damages, the arguments for allowing
recovery of punitive damages center on the language of the ADEA it-
self. 3 Courts allowing punitive damages generally have found the lan-
guage in the statute to be broad and unambiguous. 13 The ADEA is reme-
dial legislation. Thus, its broad remedial provisions do not limit punitive
damages as much as some courts have suggested. Punitive damages are
generally recoverable in an action based on a statute unless the statute
expressly denies their availability." 2 The ADEA does not specifically ne-
gate punitive relief and such relief may indeed by inferred from the stat-
ute. Section 626(b) provides that "the court shall have jurisdiction to
121. 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
122. 559 F.2d at 1040.
123. Id. at 1039-40.
124. Murphy v. American Motors Corp., 570 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1978).
125. Id. at 1226.
126. See Wise v. Olan Mills of Texas, 485 F. Supp. 542 (D. Colo. 1980); Kennedy v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Colo. 1978); Walker v. Pettit Constr.
Co., 437 F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1977), rev'd, 605 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1979); Karijolic v. Illinois
Bell Tel. Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 447 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (an example of the few
courts which have awarded punitive damages).
127. See, e.g., Stevenson v. J.C. Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Riddle v.
Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co., 460 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Okla. 1978); Gifford v. B.D. Diagnostics, 458
F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp. 780 (D. Md.
1978); Jaeger v. American Cyanamid Co., 442 F. Supp. 1270 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Hannon v.
Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1977).
128. See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1982); Walker v. Pettit
Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1979); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550
F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 131-37.
130. See generally supra text accompanying notes 75-85, 91-93, for a discussion of the
language of the ADEA.
131. Wise v. Olan Mills Inc. of Texas, 485 F. Supp. 542, 544 (D. Colo. 1980); Flynn v.
Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 463 F. Supp. 676, 678 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
132. See generally PROSSER, supra note 57, § 2.
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grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate
the purposes of this Act." 133 In addition, the language of the section uses
the words "without limitation" to precede the list of examples of equita-
ble relief available to the plaintiff.134 These two provisions suggest that
the Act makes all legal and equitable relief available, if appropriate, in
addition to the illustrations Congress provided. 135 The ADEA provides a
broad range of legal remedies. Since punitive damages are traditionally
legal relief,3 6 it would seem that such damages may be awarded.
37
B. Arguments For an Award of Punitive Damages
The principle objection to an award of punitive damages is the ADEA's
express statutory provision for liquidated damages.3 8 Section 626(b) of
the ADEA incorporates the liquidated damages provision of section
216(b) of the FLSA, limited by the proviso "[t]hat liquidated damages
shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of [the Act]."'1 39 An
award of liquidated damages under the FLSA is generally not considered
to be punitive in nature. 140 However, the ADEA, by conditioning liqui-
dated damages on a willful violation, has focused the availability of such
an award on the nature of the defendant's act.14 Thus, the liquidated
damages provision of the ADEA appears to be punitive in nature, and
several courts have so concluded in their interpretation of this provi-
sion. 42 If both liquidated and punitive damages are available, a plaintiff
could recover an excessive judgment. Therefore, Congress apparently
meant the liquidated damages provision to serve as a substitute for puni-
133. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
134. Id.
135. The principle of ejusdem generis has been used to limit relief under these sections.
Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 428 F. Supp. 533, 537 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
Under this principle of statutory construction, "where general words follow the enumeration
of particular classes of things, the general words will be construed as applying only to things
of the same general class as those enumerated .... "Campbell v. Board of Dental Examin-
ers, 53 Cal. App. 3d 283, 285 n.2, 125 Cal. Rptr. 694, 696 n.2 (1975) (citations omitted).
However, this principle should be used solely when the wording leaves some uncertainty
about the purpose of the statute and should not be applied when the context shows a con-
trary intention. Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936); BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARv
464 (5th ed. 1979).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
137. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Colo.
1978).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
139. Id.
140. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1942).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
142. See, e.g, Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1979); Wagner v.
Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank,
427 F. Supp. 215, 217-18 (D. Colo. 1977).
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tive damages.1 43
Other rationales used by the courts in denying an award of punitive
damages also center on the statutory language. Because the ADEA does
not expressly provide for punitive damages, a court may not infer such
relief from the statute. 1 4 Second, the enumeration of remedies in the Act
is limiting rather than illustrative; therefore, only the listed remedies are
available. 45 Third, the enforcement mechanisms of the FLSA are incor-
porated by reference into the ADEA; and only those damages available
under the FLSA are available under the ADEA. 146 Punitive damages are
not available under the FLSA.147 Finally, the House Conference Report
on the 1978 amendments to the ADEA states that "[tjhe ADEA as
amended by this act does not provide remedies of a punitive nature.' ' 4
The first three of these arguments may be countered by an analysis of
the statutory language, as discussed above. 49 The statement in the House
Conference Report should not be read as a part of the legislative history
of the Act. 50 The implications of this statement are inconsistent and am-
biguous. It does not state that punitive damages are unavailable under
the ADEA. The liquidated damages argument is more difficult to counter.
However, the standard under which liquidated damages are awarded dif-
fers from that under which punitive damages are awarded. Liquidated
damages are awarded upon a finding of a willful violation. 151 The stan-
dard generally applied to this provision is "voluntary and not accidental,
mistaken or inadvertent."' 52 On the other hand, the standard for an
award of punitive damages usually involves outrageous conduct on the
part of the defendant, with intentional or deliberate disregard of the con-
sequences to others. 53 Thus, two different types of conduct are required
to trigger these different remedies. The scope and amount of the awards
are also different. Liquidated damages are a doubling of the amount of
damages owing as a result of the violation of the Act.'5 Punitive damages
are measured in light of the circumstances surrounding the employer's act
143. 113 CoNG. REC. 2199, 7076 (1967) (comments of Sen. Javits).
144. Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1066 (1978); Boddorff v. Publicker Indus., 488 F. Supp. 1107, 1112-13 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
146. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1977); Boddorff
v. Publicker Indus., 488 F. Supp. 1107, 1113 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
148. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 528, 535.
149. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 109 & 112.
151. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
152. Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980).
153. MCCORMICK, supra note 57, at 280; PROSSER, supra note 57, at 9.
154. See supra note 39-42 and accompanying text.
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and his outrageous conduct.155 Thus, the two remedies are completely
distinguishable.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PURPOSE OF THE ADEA
After the consideration of the major statutory and conceptual problems
under the ADEA, the court must still consider whether the remedies of
compensatory and punitive damages are "relief as may be appropriate to
effectuate the purposes of [the Act]."'156 The purposes articulated in the
ADEA are "[promotion of] employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age; [prohibition of] arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; [and helping] employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment."' 157 Two con-
cerns are likely to be important in considering the effectiveness of com-
pensatory and punitive damages: their effect on the conciliation process,
and their ability to decrease the incidence of age discrimination.
A prerequisite to suit under the ADEA, whether brought by the EEOC
or by an individual, is an attempt by the EEOC to eliminate the discrimi-
natory practice and to settle through conciliation.1 5 There are arguments
that the availability of such damages would encourage conciliation'5" and
arguments that they would hamper conciliation.1 60 Rather than making
an employee less willing to settle voluntarily with his or her employer,
compensatory and/or punitive damages would merely shift some of the
bargaining power from the employer to the employee."1 This shift may
even enhance conciliation and make employers more willing to settle. 62
The First Circuit in Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,63 noted that
"[ilf an employer realizes that the most it stands to lose in a private suit
is lost wages, possibly doubled for a willful violation, we think it ...
might be less likely to compromise the claim short of a lawsuit.' 64 Also,
the fact is that a great majority of suits under the ADEA are not resolved
by conciliation. 6
5
Compensatory and/or punitive damages may decrease and deter future
violations of the ADEA by encouraging employees to enforce the Act
when it otherwise would not be economically feasible or when the EEOC
155. See supra text accompanying note 152.
156. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
157. Id. § 621(b).
158. Id. § 626(b).
159. Wise v. Olan Mills Inc. of Texas, 485 F. Supp. 542, 544-45 (D. Colo. 1980).
160. See, e.g., Boddorff v. Publicker Indus., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 1107, 1112-13 (E.D. Pa.
1980); Hannon v. Continental Nat'1 Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 217 (D. Colo. 1977).
161. See Wise, 485 F. Supp. at 544-45.
162. Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 1978).
163. 579 F.2d 107.
164. Id. at 111.
165. Id. at 111 & n.4. In 1976, the success rate for conciliation was 32%. Id. at 111.
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will not or cannot act. Although Congress intended to eliminate age dis-
crimination through educating the employers and the public, 166 events
have not transpired as Congress originally had hoped. Despite the De-
partment of Labor's educational and promotional programs, age discrimi-
nation has not diminished. In fact, the number of complaints has in-
creased dramatically since the early years of the ADEA.167 Thus, it
appears that the congressional plan of eliminating age discrimination
through education, information, and conciliation is not working. Awards
of compensatory and/or punitive damages could act as more effective
means of informing, educating, and eliminating age discrimination in em-
ployment. They would compensate for harm done and deter future viola-
tions. They would make an employer reconsider the economic conse-
quences of his discriminatory act. Even though the older worker increases
the employer's costs of pension, health, and insurance plans,'168 an award
of actual damages, possibly doubled, as well as compensatory and/or pu-
nitive damages could more seriously affect the economic situation of the
individual employer.
V. CONCLUSION
The enactment of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act evi-
dences a strong concern for the plight of the older worker in America.
Recent trends point to denial of awards for compensatory and/or punitive
damages as relief for violations under the Act. However, given the failure
of Congress' earlier conciliatory and educational strategy, the logical con-
clusion is to permit age discrimination plaintiffs to recover compensatory
and punitive damages in ADEA actions. As predicted by the First Circuit
in Vazquez, 6 9 the time has come when "without [such] a damage remedy
the purposes of the Act cannot be realized.' 170
Lavinia A. James
166. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
167. U.S. DEP'T oF LAnoR, supra note 14, at 8.
168. Id. at 16.
169. Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978).
170. Id. at 112.
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